Studies of Bilateral Breach Remedy by Incomplete Contract Theory

Research Project

Project/Area Number	20730006
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Fundamental law
Research Institution	Kyushu University
Principal Investigator	SATO Shigeharu Kyushu University, 現代社会学部・経済政策学科, 准教授 (00432849)
Project Period (FY)	2008 – 2010
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
Budget Amount *help	¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000) Fiscal Year 2010: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000) Fiscal Year 2009: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000) Fiscal Year 2008: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Keywords	(H)法と経済 / 法と経済 / 不完備契約 / 法的救済 / 契約不履行 / 期待利益ルール
Research Abstract	This study shows that the different outcome is derived by the extended cooperate investment model, which includes bilateral investment. Furthermore, it is shown that the strict expectation damage rule, which is possible to force negative compensation, achieves the first-best outcome.

Report

(4 results)