| Project/Area Number |
20730053
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Civil law
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| Research Institution | Hokkaido University |
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Principal Investigator |
TOKUTSU Akira Hokkaido University, 大学院・法学研究科, 准教授 (30376389)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2009
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Keywords | 株式所有構造 / 私的利益 / 会社法 / 商法 / 株式持合 / 少数株主保護 / Empty Voting / New Vote Buying / 金融商品取引法 / private benefit / 株式持ち合い / 方法二元論 / 法の経済分析 / 法とファイナンス / 公正なる会計慣行 / 法とフィクション |
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| Research Abstract |
Under the idea that stock ownership structure depends on legal rules, this research was implemented. Controlling shareholders and business partners' shareholders gain "private benefit" because they are not prohibited business favorable terms with hold companies. Private benefit impairs the other shareholders (e.g., minority shareholders), and it is demerit that company cannot be funded on favorable conditions from minority shareholders because of the existence of private benefit. But, there is merit too, because shareholders who get private benefit often possess good monitoring faculties to managers. Because "private benefit" has both merit and demerit, my research does not recommend establishing unified legal regulation against private benefit.
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