Study on incentives for information acquisition and transmission in organization design problems
| Project/Area Number |
20730134
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kagawa University |
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Principal Investigator |
AMAYA Kenichi Kagawa University, 経済学部, 准教授 (80379461)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 情報伝達 / シグナリング / チープトーク / 均衡選択 / 動学ゲーム理論 / 組織設計 / 組織の経済学 |
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| Research Abstract |
I studied the problem of information transmission in organizations by equilibrium selection concepts of dynamic game theory, under the framework of signaling and cheap talk. First, in the environment where both signaling and cheap talk is possible, the equilibrium preferred to by the worker with higher ability is evolutionarily stable. Second, when only signaling is possible, the equilibrium preferred to by the worker with higher ability is stable under perfect foresight dynamics and stochastic evolutionary dynamics if it is risk dominant.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(7 results)
