Theoretical analysis of modern firms' channel strategy
| Project/Area Number |
21730211
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Daito Bunka University (2010-2011)
Kobe International University (2009) |
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Principal Investigator |
IKEDA Takeshi 大東文化大学, 経済学部・現代経済学科, 講師 (60434940)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | チャネル間競争 / 垂直的分離 / 垂直的統合 / 価格差別 / 第三種価格差別 / 価格-数量競争 / 第3級の価格差別 / 垂直的製品差別 / 排他的テリトリー / 垂直的製品差別化 / 消費の外部性 |
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| Research Abstract |
The present study develops a vertical structure in which a manufacturer holds stock with its retailer but it allows the retailer to choose the quantity. We show that in the case when a single wholesale firm operates, it completely owns its retailing firm in equilibrium and acts as a Stackelberg leader. We also examine a case where two wholesale firms operate. We observe that each firm owns its retail firm completely when the direct effect of share holding dominates the strategic effect among the wholesale and the retail firms.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(16 results)
