The Role of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation-The Effect of Market Inefficiency and Earnings Management
Project/Area Number |
21730367
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Accounting
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Research Institution | Osaka University |
Principal Investigator |
SHIIBA Atsushi 大阪大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (60330164)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
|
Keywords | 経営者報酬 / 非効率的市場 / 意見不一致 / 利益マネジメント / ストック・オプシ / キャッシュ・フロー / 報酬契約の開示 / 比較制度分析 / 完備契約 / 不完備契約 / 動学モデル / 利益情報 / キャッシュ・フロー情報 / ストック・オプション / 評価誤差 |
Research Abstract |
I investigate the role of accounting information in executive compensation contract from the viewpoint of market inefficiency and earnings management. I discuss following five topics and contribute to literature in this area ;(1) different interpretation of the same accounting information among investors,(2) effects of manager' s earnings management,(3) the role of cash flows in compensation contract,(4) regulations of compensation disclosure, and(5) the interaction of compensation contract and other incentive mechanisms in organization.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(15 results)