Multipopulation Evolutionary Game Model with Taxation and Subsidization, and Its Application to Selfish Routing
Project/Area Number |
21760330
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Control engineering
|
Research Institution | Osaka University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
|
Keywords | 制御工学 / システム工学 / ネットワーク / 複数集団進化ゲーム / 利己的ルーティング |
Research Abstract |
We have proposed a model of interactions among multiple populations of selfish players. In our model, the government tries to control all populations to a desirable target state by taxations and subsidizations. The stabilization condition of the target state has been investigated. We have modeled the selfish routing in multisource single-sink networks as a multipopulation evolutionary game. In the model, we have investigated the occurrence condition of Braess paradox which is caused by selfish behaviors of players.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(38 results)