Comprehensive Research for a competition of suppliers and an exclusive public goods provision mechanism
Project/Area Number |
23530231
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Waseda University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
VESZTEG Robert 早稲田大学, 准教授 (30597753)
|
Research Collaborator |
LI Jiawen York大学, 大学院, 博士課程学生、博士候補生
|
Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
|
Keywords | 経済学実験 / 公共財 / 全員一致 / 多数決 / 組織形成 / クラブ形成 / 公共財供給ゲーム / 実験経済学 / 排除可能性 |
Research Abstract |
This research treats an experimental study of voluntary contribution to public goods provision with endogenous institution formation. The main focus is on exploring alternative institution formation mechanism that further improves the overall efficiency. We found that the voluntary participation of institution and a plurality voting rule within the institution to decide among multiple available contribution levels generates a satisfying results. Comparing to other mechanisms, the improvement is mainly due to a increased contribution from players who do not join the institution in the first place.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(42 results)