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Study on Coalitional Bargaining with Imperfect Implementation of Agreements

Research Project

Project/Area Number 23730201
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionOsaka University of Economics

Principal Investigator

KAWAMORI Tomohiko  大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (70550531)

Project Period (FY) 2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
Budget Amount *help
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Keywordsゲーム理論 / 交渉理論 / 提携形成 / 不完全な履行 / 割引因子 / 提携交渉 / 時間選好 / 交渉
Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study investigated coalitional bargaining where coalition (coalition government) formation and surplus distribution are not simultaneously decided. That is, it considered a model where first, a coalition is formed by bargaining, and second, a surplus distribution is decided by bargaining within the formed coalition. It characterized stationary subgame perfect equilibria. The equilibria have the following properties. A minimal winning coalition that consists of less patient players. If players' discount factors are heterogeneous, the proposals on coalitions of players who are not in this minimal winning coalition are rejected.

Report

(6 results)
  • 2014 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2013 Research-status Report
  • 2012 Research-status Report
  • 2011 Research-status Report
  • Products Report
  • Research Products

    (3 results)

All 2022 2014 Other

All Journal Article (2 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 2 results) Remarks (1 results)

  • [Journal Article] Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining2022

    • Author(s)
      Tomohiko Kawamori
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Mathematical Economics

      Volume: 99 Pages: 102582-102582

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102582

    • Related Report
      Products Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution2014

    • Author(s)
      Tomohiko Kawamori
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Mathematical Economics

      Volume: 52 Pages: 12-15

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.03.004

    • Related Report
      2013 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Remarks] 掲載誌はページ番号のない雑誌である. ページ番号の欄には論文番号を記載した.

    • Related Report
      Products Report

URL: 

Published: 2011-08-05   Modified: 2023-03-30  

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