Study on Coalitional Bargaining with Imperfect Implementation of Agreements

Research Project

Project/Area Number	23730201
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Allocation Type	Multi-year Fund
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Osaka University of Economics
Principal Investigator	KAWAMORI Tomohiko 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (70550531)
Project Period (FY)	2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
Budget Amount *help	¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000) Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Keywords	ゲーム理論 / 交渉理論 / 提携形成 / 不完全な履行 / 割引因子 / 提携交渉 / 時間選好 / 交渉
Outline of Final Research Achievements	This study investigated coalitional bargaining where coalition (coalition government) formation and surplus distribution are not simultaneously decided. That is, it considered a model where first, a coalition is formed by bargaining, and second, a surplus distribution is decided by bargaining within the formed coalition. It characterized stationary subgame perfect equilibria. The equilibria have the following properties. A minimal winning coalition that consists of less patient players. If players' discount factors are heterogeneous, the proposals on coalitions of players who are not in this minimal winning coalition are rejected.