Study on Coalitional Bargaining with Imperfect Implementation of Agreements
| Project/Area Number |
23730201
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University of Economics |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 交渉理論 / 提携形成 / 不完全な履行 / 割引因子 / 提携交渉 / 時間選好 / 交渉 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study investigated coalitional bargaining where coalition (coalition government) formation and surplus distribution are not simultaneously decided. That is, it considered a model where first, a coalition is formed by bargaining, and second, a surplus distribution is decided by bargaining within the formed coalition. It characterized stationary subgame perfect equilibria. The equilibria have the following properties. A minimal winning coalition that consists of less patient players. If players' discount factors are heterogeneous, the proposals on coalitions of players who are not in this minimal winning coalition are rejected.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(3 results)
