Asymmetric information issues: auction theory applications
| Project/Area Number |
23830054
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Osaka City University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
KITAHARA Minoru 大阪市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (80468727)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 非対称情報 / オークション / 情報の非対称性 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
(1) We extend the (static) “virtual valuation” approach of Myerson (1981) to dynamic contest design.
(2) We show a possibility of efficient allocation under ex post individual rationality with unequal initial shares by many agents.
(3) We find that even in the limit, strategic candidates would respond to the margin of victory in an excessive manner under rational voting.
|
Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(4 results)
