Asymmetric information issues: auction theory applications

Research Project

Project/Area Number	23830054
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Osaka City University
Principal Investigator	KITAHARA Minoru 大阪市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (80468727)
Project Period (FY)	2011 – 2012
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
Budget Amount *help	¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000) Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000) Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Keywords	非対称情報 / オークション / 情報の非対称性
Research Abstract	(1) We extend the (static) “virtual valuation” approach of Myerson (1981) to dynamic contest design. (2) We show a possibility of efficient allocation under ex post individual rationality with unequal initial shares by many agents. (3) We find that even in the limit, strategic candidates would respond to the margin of victory in an excessive manner under rational voting.

Report

(3 results)