Experimental Study of the Choice of Wage Scheme : Relative Payment vs. Equal Payment
Project/Area Number |
24530247
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Applied economics
|
Research Institution | Kyoto University |
Principal Investigator |
KIKUTANI TATSUYA 京都大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (80183789)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
NISHIMURA Naoko 信州大学, 経済学部, 教授 (30218200)
OGAWA Kazuhito 関西大学, 社会学部, 教授 (50405487)
SAITO Takashi 明治学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60437283)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
|
Keywords | 成果主義賃金 / 年功賃金 / マルチタスク / ヘルプ / 経済実験 / 制度選択 / 比較業績評価 / 観察可能性 / 成果主義賃金制度 / 年功賃金制度 / 分配率 / 報酬制度 / チーム生産 / 行動経済学 / 被験者実験 / 成果主義 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Under the multi-task situation where a worker has his own task and the help for his colleague, we test how the difference of wage scheme effects the allocation of effort between the two tasks by the experimental study. One of the wage schemes is the pay for performance (relative payment scheme) and the other is the seniority payment (equal payment scheme). Moreover a manager decide both the share of wages in the value added and the wage system. The result is that the manager prefers the pay for performance scheme which brings more payoffs to him, whereas it does not to the workers.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(24 results)