Cryptosystem design which detects side-channel attacks
Project/Area Number |
24560421
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Electron device/Electronic equipment
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Research Institution | Waseda University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥5,460,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,260,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
|
Keywords | 暗号回路 / LSI設計 / 故障利用攻撃 / 耐タンパ性 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
As LSI technologies have advanced, design-for-test techniques have become essential to LSI designers. Particularly, scan-path test using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques, makes test design much easier. A scan chain connects flip-flops in an LSI in series and enables LSI designers to set and observe these flip-flops easily. There are numerous researches on side-channel attacks utilizing information exploited from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem, for example, power consumption and timing information. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves the secret information by utilizing scan chains. In this attack, the secret information inside the cryptosystem is retrieved by analyzing scanned data obtained from its scan chain scheme during cryptographic processing. We demonstrate that the secret key can be retrieved successfully from the SASEBO-GII, side-channel attack standard evaluation board.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(11 results)