A study of countermeasure for Hardware Trojan
Project/Area Number |
24710190
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
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Research Institution | Ritsumeikan University |
Principal Investigator |
KUMAKI Takeshi 立命館大学, 理工学部, 任期制講師 (60452596)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
|
Keywords | ハードウェアトロイ / セキュリティ / 組込み機器 / LSI / 暗号 / AES / DES / FPGA / ARM / モバイル機器 / 暗号処理 / TDES / LSIテロリスト / ロボット / 監視回路 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In recent years, several researches for hardware Trojan and its detecting method are becoming to active rapidly.The hardware Trojan is implanted as hardware modification to conventional LSIs. After a trigger, which is an activate signal to satisfy event condition occurs, hardware Trojan-implanted chips are modified the original function to enable an adversary to control, monitor, communication and so on. Thus, an adversary can disable or destroy a system, or the Trojan can leak confidential information and secret keys convertly to the adversary. In this research, a verification board, which can execute the ARM-based SOC processing, is developed with a CPU and a FPGA. Especially, a hardware Trojan, which is implanted the cryptographic triple DES and AES circuits, is implemented in a Xilinx FPGA and is able to leak plain text and a secret-key after encrypting processing.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(20 results)