Axiomatization of auction rules with non-bossiness
| Project/Area Number |
25780139
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Takasaki City University of Economics (2014-2015)
Waseda University (2013) |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | メカニズムデザイン / オークション / Non-bossiness / Strategy-proofness / 経済理論 / 遂行理論 / マッチング / 耐戦略性 / 第１価格オークション / 非介入性 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Non-bossiness requires that any bidder cannot make a bid that affects other bidders' welfare without change of his own outcome. This study shows that first-price auction is the only rule satisfying non-bossiness together with efficiency, anonymity, and individual rationality among all auction rules, and the relationship between this auction and second-price auction, which played a central role in the existing literature, is a trade-off between ``requiring strategy-proofness or non-bossiness.'' In addition, we studied on strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in general environments and matching problems.
|
Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
