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Nonmanipulability and informational bases of social choice rules

Research Project

Project/Area Number 25780142
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionFukuoka University

Principal Investigator

SATO Shin  福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60458924)

Research Collaborator Erdamar Bora  University of Rochester
Sanver Remzi  Universite Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE
Project Period (FY) 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
Budget Amount *help
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Keywords社会的選択 / 耐戦略性 / 情報量 / 社会的厚生関数 / 社会的選択関数 / 無関連対象からの独立性 / 限定反応性
Outline of Final Research Achievements

We introduce an axiom called bounded response which requires that when agents' preferences change a little, a social choice changes a little, if any. We show that strategy-proofness can be decomposed into several properties including bounded response, and that bounded response and efficiency are satisfied only by dictatorship. Also, we show that a plurality with a runoff can be implemented with the least amount of information among desirable rules in a certain sense. Moreover, we propose a new concept called evaluationwise strategy-proofness in the preference-approval model, and show impossibility and possibility results.

Report

(4 results)
  • 2015 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2014 Research-status Report
  • 2013 Research-status Report
  • Research Products

    (12 results)

All 2016 2015 2014 Other

All Int'l Joint Research (2 results) Journal Article (5 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 5 results,  Acknowledgement Compliant: 4 results) Presentation (2 results) (of which Invited: 1 results) Remarks (3 results)

  • [Int'l Joint Research] Universite Paris-Dauphine(フランス)

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
  • [Int'l Joint Research] University of Rochester(米国)

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
  • [Journal Article] "Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff2016

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Mathematical Social Sciences

      Volume: 79 Pages: 11-19

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2016

    • Author(s)
      Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 未定 Issue: 2 Pages: 1-18

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] Bounded response of aggregated preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Mathematical Economics

      Volume: 未定 Pages: 1-15

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives2015

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 44 Issue: 1 Pages: 133-149

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8

    • Related Report
      2014 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives2014

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 42 Issue: 4 Pages: 831-851

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x

    • Related Report
      2013 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Presentation] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2015

    • Author(s)
      佐藤 伸
    • Organizer
      YNU Economics Workshop 2015
    • Place of Presentation
      横浜国立大学
    • Year and Date
      2015-03-04
    • Related Report
      2014 Research-status Report
    • Invited
  • [Presentation] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2014

    • Author(s)
      佐藤 伸
    • Organizer
      第20回DCコンファレンス
    • Place of Presentation
      福岡大学
    • Year and Date
      2014-10-13
    • Related Report
      2014 Research-status Report
  • [Remarks] 個人のウェブページ

    • URL

      https://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/

    • Related Report
      2015 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks] 個人ページ

    • URL

      https://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/

    • Related Report
      2014 Research-status Report
  • [Remarks] 個人ページ

    • URL

      http://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/

    • Related Report
      2013 Research-status Report

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Published: 2014-07-25   Modified: 2022-01-27  

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