| Project/Area Number |
25780142
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Fukuoka University |
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Principal Investigator |
SATO Shin 福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60458924)
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| Research Collaborator |
Erdamar Bora University of Rochester
Sanver Remzi Universite Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 社会的選択 / 耐戦略性 / 情報量 / 社会的厚生関数 / 社会的選択関数 / 無関連対象からの独立性 / 限定反応性 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We introduce an axiom called bounded response which requires that when agents' preferences change a little, a social choice changes a little, if any. We show that strategy-proofness can be decomposed into several properties including bounded response, and that bounded response and efficiency are satisfied only by dictatorship. Also, we show that a plurality with a runoff can be implemented with the least amount of information among desirable rules in a certain sense. Moreover, we propose a new concept called evaluationwise strategy-proofness in the preference-approval model, and show impossibility and possibility results.
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