Contract Theoretic Analysis of authority and personnel system

• Project/Area Number: 25780189
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Kobe City University of Foreign Studies
• Principal Investigator: Moriya Fumitoshi 神戸市外国語大学, 外国語学部, 准教授 (10509607)
• Research Collaborator: Yamashita Takuro
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
• Budget Amount: ¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000); Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000); Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
• Keywords: インセンティブシステム / 権限移譲 / 賃金 / モラルハザード / 権限委譲 / コミュニケーションシステム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

A purpose of my research is to develop a framework which involves an incentive system, decision process and communication system. My results are that (1) a basic trade-off between self-commitment costs and incentive costs is found, (2) these costs are closely related to communication system, (3) it is optimal to asymmetrically inform division managers even if they are ex ante symmetric.

Research Products

• [Journal Article] 会議の経済理論 (2017)
  • Author(s): 森谷 文利
  • Journal Title: Kobe city university of foreign studies working paper series Volume: 54 Pages: 1-22
  • Acknowledgement Compliant
• [Journal Article] Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2015)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya and Takuro Yamashita
  • Journal Title: HIAS discussion papers Volume: HIAS-E-18 Pages: 1-31
  • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research / Acknowledgement Compliant
• [Presentation] The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment (2016)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya
  • Organizer: The Asia-Pacific Industrial Organisation Society (APIOS) Conference 2016
  • Place of Presentation: University of Melbourne （オーストラリア）
  • Year and Date: 2016-12-12
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2015)
  • Author(s): Moriya Fumitoshi
  • Organizer: East Asian Game Theory Conference 2015
  • Place of Presentation: 早稲田大学（東京都新宿区）
  • Year and Date: 2015-08-24
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision) (2014)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya
  • Organizer: The 8th Japan-Taiwan-Hong Kong Contract Theory Conference
  • Place of Presentation: University of Hong Kong
  • Year and Date: 2014-12-06
• [Presentation] Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision) (2014)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya
  • Organizer: The 20th Decentralization Conference in Japan
  • Place of Presentation: 福岡大学
  • Year and Date: 2014-10-13
• [Presentation] Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision) (2014)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya
  • Organizer: 2014 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
  • Place of Presentation: Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
  • Year and Date: 2014-08-31
• [Presentation] Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision) (2014)
  • Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya
  • Organizer: 2014 EEA-ESEM
  • Place of Presentation: University of Toulouse 1
  • Year and Date: 2014-08-25
• [Presentation] Asymmetric information allocation to avoid disastrous outcomes (2013)
  • Author(s): 森谷文利
  • Organizer: Contract Theory Workshop: Summer Camp in Sendai 2013
  • Place of Presentation: 東北大学
• [Presentation] Asymmetric information allocation to avoid disastrous outcomes (2013)
  • Author(s): 森谷文利
  • Organizer: UNITY
  • Place of Presentation: ＵＮＩＴＹ