Contract Theoretic Analysis of authority and personnel system
| Project/Area Number |
25780189
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Kobe City University of Foreign Studies |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Research Collaborator |
Yamashita Takuro
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | インセンティブシステム / 権限移譲 / 賃金 / モラルハザード / 権限委譲 / コミュニケーションシステム |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
A purpose of my research is to develop a framework which involves an incentive system, decision process and communication system. My results are that (1) a basic trade-off between self-commitment costs and incentive costs is found, (2) these costs are closely related to communication system, (3) it is optimal to asymmetrically inform division managers even if they are ex ante symmetric.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(10 results)
