Theoretical and Experimental Approach of Mechanism Design in Transportation Service Auction
Project/Area Number |
25820236
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Civil engineering project/Traffic engineering
|
Research Institution | Tohoku University |
Principal Investigator |
Hara Yusuke 東北大学, 情報科学研究科, 助教 (50647683)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
|
Keywords | 交通計画 / メカニズムデザイン / 選好誘出 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of this study is to propose a new mechanism design for transportation service auction by eliciting individual latent preference. The needs of these mechanisms caused because the surveys (PT survey, PP survey and SP survey) could not observe the latent preference and the fact can raise the problem of decreasing social welfare. In this study, the proposed mechanism was validated by theoretical and experimental approaches. We proposed a preference elicitation mechanism focusing on the desired arrival time in the transportation service. Next, by using the theoretical analysis, we showed that the mechanism approximated true preference and the burden of the user was smaller than usual representation method. As a result, this mechanism can enhance social welfare in theoretical approach. Finally, we implemented the laboratory experiments for 1650 patients and the results showed that the proposed mechanism could obtain the similar results of theoretical analysis.
|
Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(7 results)