| Project/Area Number |
26280081
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Intelligent informatics
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| Research Institution | The University of Electro-Communications |
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Principal Investigator |
Iwasaki Atsushi 電気通信大学, 情報理工学(系)研究科, 准教授 (30380679)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
尾山 大輔 東京大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (00436742)
安田 洋祐 大阪大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (70463966)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
ANAI HIROKAZU 九州大学, マス・フォア・インダストリ研究所, 訪問教授 (20417520)
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| Research Collaborator |
YAMAMOTO SHUN 九州大学, 大学院システム情報科学研究院
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥15,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥12,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,690,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥5,590,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,290,000)
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| Keywords | メカニズム設計 / ゲーム理論 / 最適化 / 電力市場 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research project aims to develop a theory of mechanism (rule or protocol) design for electricity markets that satisfies a variety of social or technical constraints simultaneously. First, in order to understand the "capacity market" that combines two different markets of short-term in-kind electric power and long-term futures electric power, we analyzed multi-market contact under imperfect observation and designed a non-trivial equilibrium strategy. Next, we succeeded in designing an efficient mechanism for agents facing budget constraints via a parametric expression. Finally, we developed a matching mechanism dealing with social constraints such as allocating electricity preferentially to buyers with high publicity, and presented at the journal and international conferences of the top of artificial intelligence field.
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