Mathematical analysis and proposal on constrained matching formation problems
| Project/Area Number |
26870423
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Intelligent informatics
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kwansei Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Research Collaborator |
YOKOO Makoto 九州大学, システム情報科学研究院, 教授
YASUDA Yosuke 大阪大学, 経済学部, 准教授
IWASAKI Atsushi 電気通信大学, 大学院情報システム学研究科, 准教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | マッチング理論 / メカニズムデザイン / 安定性 / 情報の非対称性 / サーチ理論 / マッチング / サーチモデル / 選好順序の申告 / リクエスト構造 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We study distributional and informational constraints on matching formation. As for distributional constraint, we examine maximum and minimum quotas are imposed not only on individuals but also on regions and provide a new notion of second-best stable matching and a mechanism which always produce it because the well-known stable matching does not always exist in this case. As for informational constraints, we analyze the effect of information asymmetry in a decentralized matching market and propose a new type of matching mechanism that does not require each individual's full length of preference ordering over candidates.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
