Mathematical analysis and proposal on constrained matching formation problems

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26870423
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Intelligent informatics; Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kwansei Gakuin University
• Principal Investigator: KAWASAKI Yujiro 関西学院大学, 商学部, 助教 (50708352)
• Research Collaborator: YOKOO Makoto 九州大学, システム情報科学研究院, 教授 ; YASUDA Yosuke 大阪大学, 経済学部, 准教授 ; IWASAKI Atsushi 電気通信大学, 大学院情報システム学研究科, 准教授
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: マッチング理論 / メカニズムデザイン / 安定性 / 情報の非対称性 / サーチ理論

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We study distributional and informational constraints on matching formation. As for distributional constraint, we examine maximum and minimum quotas are imposed not only on individuals but also on regions and provide a new notion of second-best stable matching and a mechanism which always produce it because the well-known stable matching does not always exist in this case. As for informational constraints, we analyze the effect of information asymmetry in a decentralized matching market and propose a new type of matching mechanism that does not require each individual's full length of preference ordering over candidates.

Free Research Field

経済学