The design of patent buyout mechanisms

• Project/Area Number: 26885054
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Tohoku Gakuin University (2015); Kyushu University (2014)
• Principal Investigator: INAMI Yusuke 東北学院大学, 経済学部, 講師 (10735997)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-08-29 – 2016-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
• Budget Amount: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000); Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000); Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
• Keywords: 産業財産権制度 / 基礎モデルの構築

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This research analyzed patent buyout mechanisms that enhance innovation. The informational asymmetry between the firm that holds patent rights and the firm that　does not was explicitly considered. Also, a new evaluation method of patent buyout　mechanisms was proposed. It is not until firms invest in research and development　(R&D), and create new goods or develop new production technology that they are awarded patent rights. In this research, it was considered how patent buyout mechanisms affect firms’ investment behaviors in R&D.