| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MORIGUCHI Chikashi OSAKA UNIVERSITY,THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIALAND EOONOMIC RESEARCH, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (60027571)
NISIHIMURA Kazuo KYOTO UNIVERSITY,INSTITUTE OF EOONOMIC RESEARCH,PROFESSOR, 経済研究所, 教授 (60145654)
KURODA Masahiro KEIO UNIVERSITY,FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND COMMERCE, 商学部, 教授 (50051636)
AMANO Akihiro KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY,SCHOOL OF POLICY STUDIES,PROFESSOR, 総合政策学部, 教授 (30029912)
FUJIWARA Masahiro UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO,FACULTY OF EOONOMICS,PROFESSOR, 経済学部, 教授 (40114988)
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| Research Abstract |
We analyzed economic implications of global public goods such as global environments and international agreements on international fairness. Because of space limitation, we list only a part of our results.
1. In order to analyze the tradeoff between the aggregate welfare and individual rights, we constructed an analytical framework that incorporates society's assignment of rights. We also examined institutional designs in view of its implementability.
2. We conducted several empirical studies to examine the tradeoff between Environmental problems and economic growth for Japan, US and China, and analyzed its implications.
(1) We found the carbon gas elasticity of GNP is about 0.05, close to the international average, a transformation of socioeconomic system toward environment conservation is required, the vicious circle among poverty, population explosion and environmental destruction has become a major issue in global policy problem.
(2) We constructed an Input-Output table of the atmosphe
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ric hazards for Japan and China combined, and examined Japan-China joint implementation of environmental policy (economic as well as technological supports to achieve carbon gas reduction). Such problems as environmental target has not been set, no conservation target has been agreed upon, difficulty of estimating marginal abatement costs, as well as the fact that industrialized nations and developing countries disagree about a fair way to share the burden, have been identified as major problems. Nonetheless, joint implementation has been confirmed as effective for accumulation of information and piece-meal improvement of environmental strategy.
(3) We analyzed how incentives for energy conserving investment will change by the expectation that global environmental policy will be determined by multi-lateral negotiation. We found that, compared with the case when countries expect there will be no such negotiation, there will be an incentive to reduce energy conserving effort in order to strategically place the country to be in a favorable negotiation position. Less
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