2004 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
On the interrelationship between the form of property rights and the economic growth : modeling a dynamic growth model based on empirical researches on agriculture
| Project/Area Number |
13309003
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
広領域
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| Research Institution | Chiba University |
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Principal Investigator |
SAKAKIBARA Kenichi Chiba University, Faculty of Law and Economics, Professor, 法経学部, 教授 (30187009)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KANEKO Fumihiro Chiba University, Faculty of Law and Economics, Associate Professor, 法経学部, 助教授 (30302524)
KIKUCHI Masao Chiba University, Faculty of Horticulture, Professor, 園芸学部, 教授 (10241944)
FUWA Nobuhiko Chiba University, Faculty of Horticulture, Associate Professor, 園芸学部, 助教授 (90302538)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2004
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| Keywords | Philippines / agriculture / institution / game / hunusan / gama / rice / development |
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| Research Abstract |
This research aims to construct a game theoretical economic model, based on empirical researches on rice cropping in agricultural economics concerning historical institutional changes of the form of rights related to a land property, a harvesting and a labour contract in Philippines, that explains the endogenous growth through interactions between the institutional change and the technological progress, and to try to develop a new theory of economic growth. Specifically the research tries to explain the institutional changes of harvesting in Philippines from hunusan (share cropping) to gama (contract harvesting) in 1960's and 70's and from gama to new hunusan in 70's and 80's.
The main results of the research are as follows. First, we have succeeded in constructing two different game theoretic models that show the above feature of institutional changes. The first model assumes an interaction between "competitive labour markets" and a "social norm" and, contrary to that, the second one features an implicit bargaining between a farmer(principal) and villagers(agent) that gives the former a desire to devise an "incentive wage scheme". These models explain the institutional change as a shift of equilibrium point through time caused by the change in parameters of the models. In the former model, the shift is caused mainly by the population change. While in the latter one, it is caused by an innovation in a rice production technology and an expansion of job opportunities outside the village.
These models seem to suggest a possibility that the institutional change is explained by different models each of which embodies mutually exclusive assumptions from the others. Also, it seems that the institutional change might be explained by the human interrelationship of members in a society, rather than the historical materialism or the productivity growth.
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