2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
The construction of public good mechanisms for strategic delegation problems
| Project/Area Number |
15K03361
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hosei University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Keywords | 公共財 / 戦略的委託 / 交渉 / 投票制度 / 補助金政策 / 政治経済学 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We examine a situation in which two regions cooperatively provide a public good through negotiation. The negotiation is conducted by representatives, who are elected from each region. It is well-known as a strategic delegation problem that each region strategically elects its representative and as a result, the public good is inefficiently provided through negotiation. In this study, first, we strictly reevaluate how serious the problem is. Then, we show that this problem can be solved through the central government policy that combines a cost-matching grant for public good provision and reelection after the negotiation breaks down.
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| Free Research Field |
公共経済学、ミクロ経済学
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