Technology Licensing through Bargaining under Various Market Structures

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 15K17017
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Chiba University
• Principal Investigator: Kishimoto Shin 千葉大学, 大学院社会科学研究院, 准教授 (00610560)
• Project Period (FY): 2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Keywords: ミクロ経済学 / 協力ゲーム理論 / 技術移転 / ライセンス契約 / 交渉 / 寡占市場

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study theoretically analyzes agreements on technology licensing that result from bargaining among a technology holder and firms (potential licensees) in an oligopoly market. First, I formulate negotiations on a two-part tariff (a combination of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty) as a cooperative game model that includes the various situations studied in the literature, and show the properties of stable two-part tariffs that are realized through bargaining. Second, I examine the effect on social welfare of the relative bargaining power between a technology holder and a potential licensee in a duopoly market.

Free Research Field

理論経済学