2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Implementation of practical matching mechanisms
| Project/Area Number |
15K17019
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Yokohama National University |
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Principal Investigator |
Kumano Taro 横浜国立大学, 大学院国際社会科学研究院, 准教授 (00700494)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | Market design / Matching theory / School choice / Nash implementation / Indifference |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we consider priority-based matching problems in which indifferent priorities are allowed. Although indifferences in priorities are naturally present in practice, it is unknown whether constrained efficient stable matchings are implementable in any strategic solution concept. Therefore, in this study, we show that (1) stable matchings are Nash implementable via a “practical” mechanism and (2) constrained efficient stable matchings are Nash implementable if and only if priorities satisfy the conditions identified by Ehlers and Erdil (2010). These findings immediately imply that efficient and stable matchings are Nash implementable under the same condition.
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| Free Research Field |
Market Design, Matching Theory
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