2018 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Repeated Bargaining with Endogenous Disagreement Points
| Project/Area Number |
15K17028
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Meijo University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 交渉理論 / 内生的交渉決裂点 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I presented a bargaining game as follows: surpluses periodically arise; if an agreement is not achieved, with a probability, an allocation implemented in the previous round is implemented (endogenous disagreement point) and the bargaining proceeds to a next round, and with the rest probability, the game is terminated (breakdown). I showed that in this game, there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium such that acceptance and rejection of equilibrium proposals are indifferent for responders and equilibrium proposals are accepted. I explicitly characterized such an equilibrium. In a sufficiently later period, the equilibrium allocation is closely related to the equilibrium allocation of Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining game and is almost not affected by the initial exogenous disagreement point.
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| Free Research Field |
ゲーム理論
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
多数決ルールのもとでの内生的交渉決裂点の交渉ゲームの研究がいくつかあり，本研究はそれらを補完する．全員一致ルールのもとでの内生的交渉決裂点の交渉ゲームを扱った研究が1つあるが，ブレイクダウンがないため，本研究の結果とは大きく異なる．本研究では，均衡配分が毎期更新されていくが，当該既存研究ではそのようなことは起こらない．
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