2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Theoretical clarification on great strides of extreme conservatives or liberals in elections - a role of swing voters
Project/Area Number |
17K03777
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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Research Institution | Hosei University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2023-03-31
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Keywords | group contest / step-by-step technology / gerrymandering / role assignments / complementarity |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research project, we have obtained the following results: In a group's achievement with the binary characteristic of "one or nothing," we have clarified the conditions of existence of the Nash equilibrium at which no group member free-rides on the others. We have showed how an extreme representative can be elected by gerrymandering in a multi-level election. We have characterized optimal role assignments for maximizing a group's winning probability in a group contest, taking into account the complementarity of group members' efforts, and compared them with prize and multiple resource allocations schemes.
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Free Research Field |
財政学、政治科学、ミクロ経済学の応用
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Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
本課題研究で得られた成果の意義は2点ある。1つはレントシーキングモデルの1つであるグループコンテストの理論分析の文脈の中で、現実的な離散の要素を取り込んでナッシュ均衡を特徴付けしたことと、グループ内の役割分担の特徴を明示したことである。もう1つは恣意的選挙区割り(gerrymandering)が階層化された場合の結果を明示したことである。これらは現実では観察されるものの従来分析されてこなかったものである。
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