Empirical analysis of repeated auctions

2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 17K13723
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic policy
• Research Institution: Yokohama National University
• Principal Investigator: Masanori Tsuruoka 横浜国立大学, 大学院国際社会科学研究院, 准教授 (30756078)
• Project Period (FY): 2017-04-01 – 2023-03-31
• Keywords: 競争入札 / 公共調達 / 国債 / 交渉

Outline of Final Research Achievements

First, I explain a research about public-works procurement. Using data from public-works procurement in Japan, this paper examines the association between procurement outcomes and choice of auction design; specifically, scoring auctions under open procedures versus the auctions with invited bidders. The auctions under open procedures not only reduced completion time by 10 percent and the winning price by 8 percent. Next, I describe a research about government bond issuance. In 1989, the Japanese government replaced syndicate negotiations with auctions for issuing 10-year government bonds. Using this policy change as a natural experiment and a difference-in-differences methodology, this paper assesses the effect of auctions on government revenues in the primary government bond market. We find that auctions with a high level of competition are effective, bringing prices at least 1.3 percent higher than negotiated prices.

Free Research Field

産業組織論

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

一般競争入札という競争を促進する政策は、工事の品質を悪化させずに工事の価格を低下させるかを実証的に検証する点が申請者の研究の特色である。更に、公共調達の市場でどのような形で競争を促進する政策が本当に効果的なのかという点は社会的にも学術的にも重要であるといえる。一方、国債の発行市場の実証研究については、既存の国債の発行市場の研究では、複数財での一位価格入札（コンベンショナル方式）と二位価格入札（ダッチ方式）の間の政府収入や効率性の差を分析してきた。それに対し、この研究は交渉と入札を比較して、国債の発行市場で入札を使うことの政府収入への効果を検証したという特色がある。