The Interaction of the Allocation of Authority and Relational Contracts in Organizations

2020 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 17K13724
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic policy
• Research Institution: The University of Tokyo (2019-2020); National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (2017-2018)
• Principal Investigator: Ishihara Akifumi 東京大学, 社会科学研究所, 准教授 (80643668)
• Project Period (FY): 2017-04-01 – 2021-03-31
• Keywords: 組織の経済学 / 契約理論

Outline of Final Research Achievements

With regard to the two central issues in the research proposal, I found the following. (1) I analyzed the interaction between relational contracting and delegation of authority in situations where the decision makers' preferences differ, and found a relationship between delegation of authority and discounting factors, which is consistent with existing empirical studies. (2) I analyzed the interaction of delegation of authority in situations where the decision makers' opinions may differ, showed that it may be impossible to delegate authority informally, such as using subordinates' information to avoid subordinates reporting their opinions to their superiors, and suggested that this mechanism may explain some case studies.

Free Research Field

契約理論、組織の経済学、産業組織論、政治経済学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

組織における関係者間での権限の配置と関係的(暗黙的)契約の影響、およびその相互関係を明らかにすることに貢献した。とりわけ、垂直的構造を持つ組織での権限委譲を中心に考察し、関係者間で利害・意見・情報等が異なる環境において、意思決定の権限の配置と関係的契約を通じたインセンティブ供給への影響を理論的な側面から明らかにした。これらの発見は、いくつかの実証・事例研究と整合的であることを確認したとともに、現実の経営管理方針の補完性を明らかにした。