An evolutionary game approach to social choice problems

2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 18K12740
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Review Section: Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
• Research Institution: University of Tsukuba
• Principal Investigator: Sawa Ryoji 筑波大学, システム情報系, 教授 (70644566)
• Project Period (FY): 2018-04-01 – 2023-03-31
• Keywords: 確率安定性分析 / 長期的な均衡の導出 / 限定合理性 / 社会選択理論 / 協力ゲーム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The goal of this project is to relax the assumption of perfect rationality and explore the social outcomes that are reached in the long run by such boundedly rational people. The main outcome of this project is the analysis of the long-run equilibrium of social choice problems via evolutionary game theory. It is summarized in the paper “The Evolution of Collective Choice under Majority Rule” (with Akira Okada), which is made available publicly on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) website. We have been also working on exploring mechanisms that may lead society to achieve a socially desirable equilibrium. The intermediate results are summarized and published as “A Stochastic Stability Analysis with Observation Errors in Normal Form Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 129, pp.570-589, 2021, and “A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 184, pp.692-711, 2021.

Free Research Field

ゲーム理論

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

主要な成果である進化ゲーム手法を用いた社会選択問題の長期均衡については分析結果をDiscussion Paperとして社会へ発信を行った。また、社会を適切な均衡へ導くメカニズムについて、解明の途中成果をGames and Economic Behavior、およびJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationなどの国際ジャーナルにて公刊した。これら成果は、人々が完全に合理的ではない場合に長期的に到達する均衡を様々な状況において理論的に示している。今後の継続研究や進化ゲームの社会応用への可能性を広げることが出来た。