2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

On theory of the collective choice and the mechanism design including the voting system with some applications to problems of the collective decision making of shareholders

Research Project

Project/Area Number	19530162
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Section	一般
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Waseda University
Principal Investigator	SASAKI Hiroo Waseda University, 商学学術院, 教授 (30196175)
Project Period (FY)	2007 – 2009
Keywords	ミクロ経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 社会選択 / メカニズムデザイン / 投票力指数 / 次善の効率性 / 戦略的操作不可能性 / 拒否権
Research Abstract	In this research project, we studied the mechanism design of resource allocation mechanisms from several different points of view when the price mechanism does not necessarily work well. If one cannot use the market mechanism for allocating resources, economic agents should report information on their own preferences to a coordinator (e.g., the government) of the allocation, and the coordinator should aggregate the information and perform the allocation according to a predetermined allocation rule. The voting system is a typical example of such an aggregation rule. We investigated and evaluated several resource allocation mechanisms including the voting mechanism.