2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Performance of mechanisms for providing public goods and learning of equilibrium strategies : A theoretical and experimental study.

Research Project

Project/Area Number	19530164
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Section	一般
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Tenri University
Principal Investigator	SOYAMA Noriko Tenri University, 人間学部・総合教育研究センター, 准教授 (50309522)
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha)	MORI Toru 名古屋市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (60134160)
Project Period (FY)	2007 – 2009
Keywords	実験経済学 / 公共的意思決定 / 探索行動 / Nash均衡戦略 / supermodularity
Research Abstract	In this research, we investigated the performance of Pivotal mechanisms and attainability of Nash equilibrium through Groves-Ledyard mechanism by the experimental economics method. Two points to mention in the following can be shown as this research result. 1) Pivotal mechanism, which is applied to problem of providing size of public products changing continuously under the strictly concave evaluation function can generate the payoff structure, has no best response other than truth-telling as dominant strategy, therefore it achieves the best performance under adaptive processes for learning dominant strategy. 2) In the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, punishment parameter γ is required value over the minimum value of convergence condition under Nash behavior, however individual behavior strategies can converge to Nash equilibrium under low γ less than high γ which is able to satisfy supermodurality.