2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Mechanism Design in Economic Environments
Project/Area Number |
20530147
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Tohoku University |
Principal Investigator |
OHSETO Shinji 東北大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (00278475)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2012
|
Keywords | メカニズム・デザイン / 非分割財 / 排除可能な公共財 / 相互評価 |
Research Abstract |
This research mainly studies the problem of mechanism design in economic environments. First, we show the nonexistence of desirable mechanisms for the problem of allocating a single indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible. Second, we propose a new family of mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public good and discuss the relationship between the maximal welfare loss and maximal manipulation. Third, we investigate mutual evaluation mechanisms that satisfy monotonicity and unanimity.
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