2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Study on incentives for information acquisition and transmission in organization design problems

Research Project

Project/Area Number	20730134
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Kagawa University
Principal Investigator	AMAYA Kenichi Kagawa University, 経済学部, 准教授 (80379461)
Project Period (FY)	2008 – 2010
Keywords	情報伝達 / シグナリング / チープトーク / 均衡選択 / 動学ゲーム理論
Research Abstract	I studied the problem of information transmission in organizations by equilibrium selection concepts of dynamic game theory, under the framework of signaling and cheap talk. First, in the environment where both signaling and cheap talk is possible, the equilibrium preferred to by the worker with higher ability is evolutionarily stable. Second, when only signaling is possible, the equilibrium preferred to by the worker with higher ability is stable under perfect foresight dynamics and stochastic evolutionary dynamics if it is risk dominant.

(4 results)