Analysis of dishonest behavior of public servant and future public servant: how to discourage dishonest behavior.

2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 20K01626
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Review Section: Basic Section 07040:Economic policy-related
• Research Institution: Soka University (2022); Fukushima University (2020-2021)
• Principal Investigator: Ojima Takeshi 創価大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60754827)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 林 嶺那 福島大学, 行政政策学類, 准教授 (60846236) ; 森川 想 東京大学, 大学院工学系研究科(工学部), 講師 (10736226)
• Project Period (FY): 2020-04-01 – 2023-03-31
• Keywords: 不正行動 / 公民比較 / 経済実験 / 公務員 / リスク / コミットメント

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Our economic experiment and incentivized online survey, conducted both nationally and internationally, show the following points. 1. Government employees are more honest than employees who work in the private sector. 2. Government employees are more risk averse in the sense of the fourth-order risk than employees working in the private sector. In other words, Government employees are averse to tail risk. 3. The same degree of dishonesty is observed in developing countries with a high corruption index and in developed countries with a low corruption index. 4. Dishonest behavior is discouraged by devices that enable participants to commit to honesty. However, implicitly directing participants to commitment opportunities through nudges does not have the effect of discouraging participant cheating. We have written papers on 1. 2. 3. and reported them at conferences. The results of other analyses will be summarized and reported in a paper.

Free Research Field

行動経済学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

１．と２．は公務員の得手不得手と定説な制度が民間の会社員と異なることを示唆する。３．は不正直さと汚職が直接関係しない可能性を示唆する。４．はコミットメント機会がいずれの国でも不正を抑制する効果があることを示唆するが、ナッジによる不正防止には限界があり、不正抑制のためには意識的な選択をもたらす制度設計が必要であることを示唆している。これらの結果は生産性を下げずに効率的な不正防止策を編み出すための知見となる。