Empirical analysis of asymmetric auction in electric power procurement auctions

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 22730209
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Research Field: Applied economics
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Suzuki Ayako 早稲田大学, 国際教養学術院, 准教授 (20327696)
• Project Period (FY): 2010-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 非対称オークション / 電力産業

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study investigates the bidding patterns of entrant and incumbent firms in electric power procurement auctions in the Japanese retail electricity market. The study explores the reasons for the persistently low participation rate of entrants and the effects of preferential treatment aimed at enhancing the participation of entrants. The achievement of the study includes the data collection. We collected the information on each auction, including losing bids, from each auctioneer in accordance with the information disclosure system. The structural estimation of a static model found that bid discounts have little effect on entrant participation and that a lump-sum subsidy to entrants is more cost effective by enhancing participation of entrants. However, this model fails to consider the effect of supply capacity constraints of entrant, and the next step of the current study will be to take the capacity constraint into account of the model.

Free Research Field

産業組織論