2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Stochastic stability in games with multiple populations: Theory and application
| Project/Area Number |
23530229
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Nihon University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
OKADA Akira 一橋大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 教授 (90152298)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 協調ゲーム / 均衡選択 / 確率進化 / タカハト・ゲーム / 社会的ジレンマ |
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| Research Abstract |
In stochastic stability/evolution analysis, while single-population models have been developed well, they are not very good at dealing with many-person and/or asymmetric games. In contrast, multiple-population models can easily accommodate those games. Our research project aims to develop stochastic stability analysis based on multiple-population models.
In particular, we consider the formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conflicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model is applied to a game of group formation where voluntary participants negotiate for an institution to enforce them to cooperate. For a class of group formation games with two types, the stochastically stable equilibrium can be characterized in terms of the Nash products of the associated hawk-dove games, which summarize the strategic interaction among the individuals in the game.
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