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2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Asymmetric information issues: auction theory applications

Research Project

  • PDF
Project/Area Number 23830054
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionOsaka City University

Principal Investigator

KITAHARA Minoru  大阪市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (80468727)

Project Period (FY) 2011 – 2012
Keywords非対称情報 / オークション
Research Abstract

(1) We extend the (static) “virtual valuation” approach of Myerson (1981) to dynamic contest design.
(2) We show a possibility of efficient allocation under ex post individual rationality with unequal initial shares by many agents.
(3) We find that even in the limit, strategic candidates would respond to the margin of victory in an excessive manner under rational voting.

  • Research Products

    (1 results)

All 2011

All Presentation (1 results)

  • [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design2011

    • Author(s)
      Kitahara, Minoru and Ryo Ogawa
    • Organizer
      presented by the co-author in 日本経済学会秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      茨城県つくば市
    • Year and Date
      2011-10-30

URL: 

Published: 2014-08-29  

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