Game Theoretic Studies of Endogenous Leadership in Prisoner's Dilemma with Inequity-Averse Preferences

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24530198
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kobe University
• Principal Investigator: SUEHIRO Hideo 神戸大学, 経営学研究科, 教授 (30162837)
• Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha): KOBAYASHI Hajime 関西大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10347510) ; ABE Koji 横浜国立大学, 大学院国際社会研究院, 准教授 (40582523)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 不公平回避選好 / リーダーシップ

Outline of Final Research Achievements

When a group of individuals work in a team, there often arises a prisoner's dilemma, in which it is desirable for all the members of the team to make effort for the team while each member dose not find an interest to make the effort alone. It is widely experienced that such a dilemma is resolved occasionally by leadership in which a member of the team voluntarily make the effort in ahead of others. This fact is also verified in the research of experimental economics. However, it remains unexplored why such a limited leadership is observed.
We took into account the reported human nature that an individual tends to avoid his receiving less benefit than others in the team and to avoid also his receiving more benefit than others in the team. We showed by the method of game theory that an individual with a particular parameters of those aversion takes the leadership.

Free Research Field

ゲーム理論