Experimental Study of the Choice of Wage Scheme : Relative Payment vs. Equal Payment

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24530247
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Applied economics
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: KIKUTANI TATSUYA 京都大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (80183789)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): NISHIMURA Naoko 信州大学, 経済学部, 教授 (30218200) ; OGAWA Kazuhito 関西大学, 社会学部, 教授 (50405487) ; SAITO Takashi 明治学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60437283)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 成果主義賃金 / 年功賃金 / マルチタスク / ヘルプ / 経済実験 / 制度選択 / 比較業績評価 / 観察可能性

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Under the multi-task situation where a worker has his own task and the help for his colleague, we test how the difference of wage scheme effects the allocation of effort between the two tasks by the experimental study. One of the wage schemes is the pay for performance (relative payment scheme) and the other is the seniority payment (equal payment scheme). Moreover a manager decide both the share of wages in the value added and the wage system. The result is that the manager prefers the pay for performance scheme which brings more payoffs to him, whereas it does not to the workers.

Free Research Field

Organizational Economics