Bank supervisors' civil liability for negligent banking supervision

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24653019
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Civil law
• Research Institution: University of Tsukuba
• Principal Investigator: YANAGA Masao 筑波大学, ビジネスサイエンス系, 教授 (60191144)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 金融監督 / 国家賠償責任 / 不法行為法 / ヨーロッパ / 英連邦諸国

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Limiting bank supervisors’ liability is becoming popular in the EU. This trend is also confirmed by the regimes in force outside the EU both in some emerging countries and in the common law ones. The arguments in favour of limitation of supervisor’s liability are as follows: (i) the threat of liability can inhibit supervisors from freely exercising their discretionary powers and supervisory authorities should enjoy the necessary margin of manoeuvre for the effective performance of their statutory duties; (ii) the deeper pockets argument; and (iii) floodgates argument.

Free Research Field

金融法、会社法、制度会計