2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Stability and strategy-proofness in matching problems
| Project/Area Number |
24730177
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2014-03-31
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| Keywords | マッチング / マーケット・デザイン / メカニズム・デザイン / 安定性 / 耐戦略性 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
We consider problems of matching mechanism design from the viewpoint of stability and strategy-proofness. The first research studies one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition (NDC), and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. We also show that under the assumption that the preference domain for the agents on one side is unrestricted, if there is a stable and strategy-proof rule, then the NDC is satisfied. The second research studies many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences where unacceptable agents may exist on both sides and explore conditions for the core to be a singleton. We investigate two types of necessary and sufficient conditions for that. One is a condition on the preferences of the colleges, called acyclicity and the other is a condition on the capacities of the colleges.
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