Dynamic Societal Games and Stochastic Approximation

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25780127
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: The University of Tokyo
• Principal Investigator: OYAMA Daisuke 東京大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (00436742)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: societal game / dynamic game / equilibrium selection / potential game / supermodular game / economic growth / agglomeration

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The purpose of this project has been to develop a theoretical framework which connects deterministic macroeconomic dynamics with a continuum of players with finite-player stochastic games, thereby establishing approximation results as the number of players tends to infinity, and to enhance our understanding on equilibrium selection results based on societal games and mathematically related theories. I obtained new results and insights on stochastic approximation of asynchronous-move noisy stochastic games, contagion of behavior in general supermodular network games, equilibrium selection based on a new class of deterministic evolutionary dynamics, and the impact of small probability events on higher order beliefs. These have been published or reported in international refereed journals and conferences.

Free Research Field

経済理論・ゲーム理論