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2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Axiomatization of auction rules with non-bossiness

Research Project

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Project/Area Number 25780139
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionTakasaki City University of Economics (2014-2015)
Waseda University (2013)

Principal Investigator

Adachi Tsuyoshi  高崎経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (00535122)

Project Period (FY) 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
Keywordsメカニズムデザイン / オークション / Non-bossiness / Strategy-proofness
Outline of Final Research Achievements

Non-bossiness requires that any bidder cannot make a bid that affects other bidders' welfare without change of his own outcome. This study shows that first-price auction is the only rule satisfying non-bossiness together with efficiency, anonymity, and individual rationality among all auction rules, and the relationship between this auction and second-price auction, which played a central role in the existing literature, is a trade-off between ``requiring strategy-proofness or non-bossiness.'' In addition, we studied on strategy-proofness and non-bossiness in general environments and matching problems.

Free Research Field

理論経済学

URL: 

Published: 2017-05-10  

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