Nonmanipulability and informational bases of social choice rules

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25780142
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Fukuoka University
• Principal Investigator: SATO Shin 福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60458924)
• Research Collaborator: Erdamar Bora University of Rochester ; Sanver Remzi Universite Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 社会的選択 / 耐戦略性 / 情報量

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We introduce an axiom called bounded response which requires that when agents' preferences change a little, a social choice changes a little, if any. We show that strategy-proofness can be decomposed into several properties including bounded response, and that bounded response and efficiency are satisfied only by dictatorship. Also, we show that a plurality with a runoff can be implemented with the least amount of information among desirable rules in a certain sense. Moreover, we propose a new concept called evaluationwise strategy-proofness in the preference-approval model, and show impossibility and possibility results.

Free Research Field

社会的選択理論