A Non-Folk-Theorematic Approach to the Theory of Repeated Games
Project/Area Number |
20530153
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Kyoto University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
|
Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / 不完全公的観測 / チーム生産 / シェアリングルール / カルテル / 多市場接触 / 需要変動 / 観測オプション / 協調可能命題 / フォーク定理 / 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / 不完全観測 / ターンオーバー / 有限回繰り返しゲーム / ネットワーク / 不完全私的観測 / 費用観測 |
Research Abstract |
We conduct theoretical analysis of the model of repeated games where sufficient conditions for a folk theorem (a general efficiency result) fail. Mainly in the model of partnerships under imperfect public monitoring and the model of cartel s with a small discount factor, we characterize the equilibrium which is most efficient in the sense of maximizing the players’ total payoffs. We also formulate a model of repeated games where monitoring is part of a player’s decision making, and present sufficient conditions for existence of cooperative equilibria which provide proper incentives about monitoring.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(15 results)