Strategic revelation of the number of bidders on sequential online auctions

• Project/Area Number: 24730172
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Daito Bunka University
• Principal Investigator: TSUCHIHASHI Toshihiro 大東文化大学, 経済学部, 講師 (10615503)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
• Budget Amount: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000); Fiscal Year 2014: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000); Fiscal Year 2013: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000); Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
• Keywords: オンラインオークション / シグナル / 留保価格 / 即決価格 / 国際情報交換

Outline of Final Research Achievements

I obtained the finding that, regarding an analysis of a strategic behaviour of a seller with private information, a buyout price as well as a reserve price has an important role to a seller's strategic behaviour. Concretely, a buyout price as well as a reserve pricecan serve as a signal to reveal information about a number of bidders, quality and condition of items.
I made a discussion paper "Auctions with a buyout price: A survey" which marshals the literature of a buyout price.