| Project/Area Number |
25518002
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
公共政策
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
HIHARA Katsuya 東京大学, 大学院公共政策学連携研究部, 客員研究員 (70526673)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 契約理論 / 航空政策 / ゲーム理論 / リスク分配 / プリンシパルエージェント理論 / 交通経済学 / 交通政策 / 確率的動的最適化 / 交通経済 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The relationship between airport and airline is multi-functional and complex since it is conflicting and cooperating at the same time. Recently some airports and airlines signed such risk sharing contracts that allocate revenue/profit fluctuation risk between them. Ministry of Transport is also considering such risk allocation contracts between the two in deciding the slot allocation at congested airports like Haneda.
This research, based on contract theory, game theory, principal-agent theory and transport economics, has shown that if a risk allocation contract is designed properly, then it functions as an incentive device to enhance the effort levels of both airport and airline, overcoming the moral hazard problem arising from asymmetric information structures in the real business environment. Also such risk allocation contract brings about higher utility level not only of airport and airline, but also of passengers to use the air routes at the airport.
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