2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
A Theoretical Analysis of Default Rules in Modern Contract Law
| Project/Area Number |
15H06546
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Civil law
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| Research Institution | Nagoya University (2016)
Kyoto Prefectural University (2015) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-08-28 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | 契約 / 任意法規 / 取引費用 / 情報の非対称性 / 行動経済学 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research explores fundamental theoretical analysis of default rules in contract law. A key aspect of this research is functional analysis of default rules. Default rules have functions to reduce transaction costs, to solve the problem of asymmetric information and to help parties make rational decisions. From this point of view, default rules should fill gaps of contracts based on hypothetical bargains and lead party's decision making in some cases. This might sound ambivalent, but analysis of this research suggests that both are justified from a perspective, social welfare.
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| Free Research Field |
法学
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