2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
A Non-Folk-Theorematic Approach to the Theory of Repeated Games
| Project/Area Number |
20530153
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
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| Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / 不完全公的観測 / チーム生産 / シェアリングルール / カルテル / 多市場接触 / 需要変動 / 観測オプション |
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| Research Abstract |
We conduct theoretical analysis of the model of repeated games where sufficient conditions for a folk theorem (a general efficiency result) fail. Mainly in the model of partnerships under imperfect public monitoring and the model of cartel s with a small discount factor, we characterize the equilibrium which is most efficient in the sense of maximizing the players’ total payoffs. We also formulate a model of repeated games where monitoring is part of a player’s decision making, and present sufficient conditions for existence of cooperative equilibria which provide proper incentives about monitoring.
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